A British Soldier’s View of the War on Terror

Leo Docherty is a former officer in Prince Harry’s Household Division. A veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, his service in Helmand led him to leave the army. In an opinion piece in The Independent, Docherty says the publicity over Harry shows that we have the wrong idea about the war in Afghanistan:

“In September 2006, British forces attacked and occupied what was until that point a thriving agricultural town. This means that the local farmers, who are poor cash-croppers exploited by opium barons, grow a great deal of poppy. But the British arrival, as in other towns across Helmand, brought nothing but military might – no means of development, no improvement in local living standards and no alternative to the poppy.

The most basic tenets of counter-insurgency were abandoned in the Army’s haste to see action. Violence ensued as poppy farmers and opium traffickers teamed up with the Taliban to oppose the foreign occupiers. As the first British bombs fell, killing Afghan civilians, the battle for hearts and minds was lost.

The fighting rages still and opium production has soared to new heights. Overwhelming firepower (the kind that Harry co-ordinates) cannot resolve the fact that the British campaign in Helmand is illogical; we are trying to fight our way to winning hearts and minds and losing the trust of the population in doing so. Scores of civilians have been killed by British ordnance in Helmand. In 2007, at least 6,000 people died in the conflict across Afghanistan, of which approximately 1,400 were civilians. At least 500 of these deaths were directly attributable to Nato forces, mostly in air strikes; 89 British troops have been killed and 329 injured.

In 2003 my fellow officers and I knew the WMD issue was a blatant ruse, but we cared little. Scenting action we ignored the fact that we’d been told a pack of lies, and satisfied ourselves with the vague notion that it was all for the good. We simply craved active service.

Given the monumental human tragedy that has unfolded in Iraq over the past five years, you’d think that further military adventures hatched on the backs of MoD fag packets would have been guarded against, but along came Helmand province.

Tragically, the fact that many soldiers are killed in these operations serves only to strengthen the myths of heroism and sacrifice that the Army relies on to pursue these adventures in the first place. These ideals allow the admirable personal qualities of soldiers killed on operations to be readily confused with the nature of the conflict. Partly a psychological defence mechanism, it allows soldiers to come to terms with the deaths of their colleagues without calling into question the fundamental reason for such deaths.

This graveside reasoning goes roughly like this: “He loved his job and the Army; he was an honourable man; therefore his death can only be honourable and worthwhile.” Following this line of reasoning after the deaths of friends and colleagues in Iraq and Afghanistan, I eventually found the answers wanting, became disillusioned and left. But if a few disillusioned officers leave, it makes no difference to the Army; there are always more fresh faces arriving from Sandhurst.

Rather than highlighting the appalling truths about the war in Helmand, the media, dazzled by the heroic ideal that Prince Harry so perfectly embodies, perpetuate the myth that this is a just war fit for heroes. The frenzy of coverage in Friday’s papers (with the conspicuous exception of this newspaper) was facile; “Watch Prince Harry fighting in Helmand,” proffered one broadsheet website.

This is war reduced to entertainment, willingly ignorant of the truth that young men like Harry, both British and Afghan, are dying violent pointless deaths in Helmand province. Outrage is the only response to this, not entertainment.”

 

Taking the Fight to the Taliban

That was the title of a BBC documentary on the Queen’s Company of the Grenadier Guards in Afghanistan that aired on CBC last night. It presented a troubling look at the Taliban, seen through a NATO gunsight.

The Brits are trying to control Helmand province just as Canada has responsibility for Kandahar province. Like Canada, the Brits are heavy on firepower and light on manpower.

The 90-minute documentary followed about 60-British soldiers patrolling for the Taliban. They found them. When the Brits fixed the insurgents’ positions, they brought in gunship helicopters, mortars, heavy machine guns and, finally, jet fighters to pulverize their hopelessly outgunned guerrilla adversaries.

What happened? Time after time the Brits called down the best of Western killing technology on the Taliban. They rocketed houses where the bad guys were sited. They even blew entire housing compounds completely to rubble with 500-pound bombs. They lobbed mortar rounds at them and raked their positions with heavy machine gun fire. It was spectacular. And then there was calm and the Brits and their Afghan army counterparts began to relax and walk around. Within minutes the Taliban opened up again, sending them scrambling for cover.

This happened over and over. They must have been killing the Taliban in large numbers but, each time, it was the Taliban who brought the fight back to the Brits, attacking their vastly superior enemies.

I was left wondering how a handful of insurgents, armed with only 50s vintage assault rifles and a few rocket-propelled grenades, could stand their ground, again and again, against such withering fire? Why didn’t they run?

Eventually sunset arrived and the Taliban did leave, on their own terms and with their weapons and casualties. When the Brits patrolled the area the following morning they found neither bodies nor abandoned weapons.

If this is the enemy we’re up against, we can get rid of any illusions about breaking these people. Rockets and bombs and artillery aren’t going to decide this conflict. I think we’d better figure out a new approach.